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Abstract This paper fruitfully combines two complementary theories: performance
measurement and input-output analysis. Our point of departure is the theory of the
consumer, whomaximizes utility subject to a budget constraint. His well-being can be
measured by the change in the consumption bundle, valued at constant prices. Input-
output analysis is invoked to impute the change in this bundle to technical change, a
terms-of-trade effect and two types of efficiency change. The analysis is extended to
environmental economics.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I bring to fruition the neoclassical measurement of performance change
in an input-output framework. Some pitfalls are avoided. First, market prices need
not be perfectly competitive and, more generally, the observed allocation of resources
may be inefficient. Solow’s ascription of TFP-growth to technical change holds in an
idyllic neoclassical world where resources are rewarded according to their marginal
productivities, but not beyond. Market power, managerial slacks and other sources
of inefficiency abound and we must factor in their variations to properly account
for performance changes. Since these conditions differ between industries, an input-
output framework seems promising.
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The strategy of this paper is the following. I find it reasonable to assume that
households are price takers. This point of departure is quite powerful, because the first
order condition of the problem of the consumer, which equates the marginal rates of
substitution to the price ratios, reveal that prices measure marginal utilities (up to an
uninteresting multiplicative constant, the marginal utility of money) even when those
prices are distorted. So I measure changes in the level of well-being of consumers by
tracking final consumption. Then I use input-output analysis to decompose that bill
of final goods and services. It may increase due to reductions in input coefficients,
Solow’s technical change, but obviously for other reasons as well. This paper sorts it
out.
2 Utility based performance measurement
In general equilibrium analysis - of which input-output is an important instance -
consumers have initial endowments, including their labor skills. Some consumers are
better off than others, i.e. have bigger endowments, and this translates into greater
budget sets, hence opportunities. If, however, we assume away income effects in their
utility functions - as is the case for constant elasticity of substitution (including Cobb-
Douglas and Leontief) utility functions, then the relationship between the percentage
rate of change in utility and in consumption is independent of the level of well being.
Formally, a consumer maximizes U(x) subject to px ≤ pω, where x is a con-
sumption vector, ω the initial endowment, p the price (row) vector, and U the utility
function. I assume U is linearly homogeneous (no income effects). Exogenous to the
consumer are p and ω (price taking behavior). How does the consumer respond to
change? Well, that’s determined by the envelope theorem, according to which the
change in the objective value is given by the partial derivatives of the objective func-
tion with respect to the exogenous parameters. (The point of the theorem is that the
change in the endogenous parameter, consumption, may be ignored.) Since the en-
velope theorem is formulated for free maximization problems, we must first handle
the constraint. This is done in the usual way by setting up the Lagrangian function,
U(x) + λ(pω − px), and maximizing that.
Change the parameters: dp and dω. By the envelope theorem dU is determined
by the partial derivatives with respect p and ω. The first effect is λ(ω − x)dp; the
consumer is better of his resources are priced higher and worse off if his consump-
tion bundle is priced higher. The second effect is λp dω; the consumer is better off
if he is better endowed. In total dU = λdp(ω − x) + λp dω. This can be simpli-
fied. (For simplicity I assume, quite realistically, that the budget constraint is bind-
ing, but otherwise the simplification still holds by the phenomenon of complimen-
tary slackness, λ = 0.) Differentiating the budget equation, p(ω − x) = 0, we obtain
dp(ω − x) + p dω − p dx = 0. Substituting, dU = λp dx. The well-being of the
consumer is assessed by tracking consumption. An immediate and well known con-
sequence is that the vector of marginal utilities is U ′ = λp.
Here the Lagrange multiplier is the marginal utility of income, but the no-
income effects assumption gets rid of it. Formally, linear homogeneity means
U(θx) = θU(x). Differentiating with respect to (positive) θ , using the chain rule,
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U ′(x)x = U(x). (This is Euler’s theorem.) The (percentage) rate of change of util-
ity becomes now dU/U = λp dx/U ′(x)x = λp dx/λpx = p dx/px. If we have two
consumers, then their rates of change are p dx1/px1 and p dx2/px2. Defining x
as the total consumption bundle, the weighted average is (px1/px)p dx1/px1 +
(px2/px)p dx2/px2 = p dx/px. In other words, p dx/px is a robust measure for
tracking utility.
Performance, however, is the latter per unit of endowment, hence as a growth rate
performance is measured by subtracting the change in endowment from the change
in consumption: (p dx − p dω)/px.
3 Embedding performance measurement in the input-output framework
I assume that utility is a function of the consumption of the produced commodities.
This neglects the utility of leisure time, but is not bad if labor is supplied inelastically
(e.g. when overall utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of commodity consumption util-
ity and leisure). I also identify household consumption with domestic final demand,
i.e. incorporating investment. This has been given a theoretical foundation by Weitz-
man (1976). Net output y = x + z + s, where z is net exports and s is slack (output
not allocated to intermediate demand, domestic final demand or exports, i.e. inven-
tory investment). The initial endowment does not enter this equation. I assume that
the initial endowment consists of (currently) nonproduced factors, capital K and la-
bor L. This dichotomy between produced and nonproduced commodities is handled
by reserving the last two dimensions for capital and labor, with prices r and w. With
a slight abuse of notation I reserve p for the price (row) vector of the produced goods
and services-the price vector of Section 2 becoming (p w r). The performance mea-
sure becomes (p dx − r dK − wdL)/px.
If there is no slack (s = 0) and balance of payments (pz = 0) then consumption x
may be replaced by net output y in the performance measure and we recognize the
Solow residual. I will not make these neoclassical assumptions. I will use, however,
the balance equations, for gross output q = Aq + y, and for the factor inputs K =
kq + κ and L = lq + λ. Input-output coefficients populate matrix A (intermediate
inputs) and row vectors k and l (factor inputs). κ and λ represent idle capital and
labor. (Product slack s was already accounted for in net output y.) Substitution turns
performance (p dx − r dK − wdL)/px into [p d(q − Aq − z − s) − r d(kq + κ) −
wd(lq + λ)]/px. Applying the product rule to Aq , kq and lq , and rearranging, the
numerator of this performance measure is decomposed into four parts:
(i) −(p dA + r dk + wdl)q
(ii) −p dz
(iii) (p − pA − rk − wl)dq
(iv) −(p ds + r dκ + wdλ)
All have to be divided by px. The first term measures the reductions in the input
coefficients, i.e. technical change. Because we multiply with gross output compo-
nents and divide by the main component of net output, this is a weighted average
of industrial Solow residuals, with the weight summing to the gross/net output ratio
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of the economy (Domar aggregation, ten Raa 2006). The second term measures the
value in the change in the net imports, −z, i.e. the terms-of-trade-effect. It is straight-
forward to understand this. If the balance of payments does not change, pz constant,
then −p dz = (dp)z, which measures the improvement in the prices of the net ex-
ports. The third term measures the reallocation of output in terms of profitability, i.e.
allocative efficiency change. The fourth term measures the reduction of slack in the
utilization of goods and services, capital and labor, i.e. X-efficiency change (Comanor
and Leibenstein 1969).
A perfectly competitive economy shows only the first two effects, technical change
and the terms-of-trade effect. Indeed, the trade sector can be considered an industry
where the exports are the inputs and the imports are the outputs. An improvement in
the terms of trade is a reduction of the exports required per unit of imports, just like
a reduction of the input coefficients in the regular industries. Solow (1957) analyzed
a closed perfectly competitive economy and discovered that the residual (now called
Solow residual) measures technical change. The role of the term-of-trade has been
in the air for long and was articulated by ten Raa and Mohnen (2002). They also
relate the broad decomposition into technical change and efficiency change to the op-
erations research/productivity literature. The further decomposition into X-efficiency
and allocative efficiency has been studied in the same literature, but in micro contexts.
This paper encompasses all, using an input-output framework of the economy.
I have not assumed that the prices are equilibrium prices. Even when prices are dis-
torted, they point the way to the greatest increase of utility, by the first order condition
of the problem of the consumer, and that’s all we needed. Things get different when
one wants to assess the level of efficiency. This is matter of determining how much
better off the consumers could be. There are several ways to find the Pareto frontier.
A natural one - particularly when assuming linearly homogeneous utility functions
- is to find alternative allocations that maximize the utility levels with a common
multiplicative factor, subject to the balances. Then the prices are the shadow prices
to the latter constraints. This methodology is particularly helpful when markets are
incomplete, prices are missing.
4 The environmental extension
The classical example of missing prices is that for externalities, such as pollution.
Elsewhere I (2008) have argued that a conservative way to estimate the inefficiency
involved is to assume Leontief preferences. I have also shown that, then, the problem
to determine inefficiency is solved by maximizing the level of consumption subject to
the balance constraints. Denote that level by u, where the observed level corresponds
to u = 1. Hence u is the expansion factor for consumption. For example, if u can be
1.25, then consumption could be 25% higher and, therefore, it is only at 80% of its
potential. We say that the economy is 20% inefficient. The constraints are Aq +xu+
z ≤ q , kq ≤ K, lq ≤ L, pz ≤ pz◦. Here the variables are q , u, z. pz◦ is the observed
trade balance, at world prices. Maximizing u, the shadow prices to the produced
balance constraint can be seen to be proportional to p (ten Raa 2006). The shadow
prices to the next two constraints are denoted r and w. Bring in emission coefficients,
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organized in row vector m, and a policy level M of maximum emission. That is
equivalent to adding a constraint mq ≤ M . Denote the shadow price by t , then the
dual constraint becomes p ≤ pA+rk+wl+ tm, with slack indicating that the output
of a product must be zero. These shadow prices are competitive prices, sustaining the
efficient allocation, and reflect the cost of pollution, which is equal to the Pigovian
tax.
Performance growth accounting à la Section 3 is straightforward, because formally
pollution is equivalent to the addition of a third resource.
5 Conclusion
The reconciliation of performance measurement and input-output analysis is mutu-
ally beneficial. The input-output framework facilitates economy-wide performance
measurement, including a quantification of the terms-of-trade effect and a decompo-
sition of efficiency change in allocative and X-efficiency changes, even down to the
level of industry. Conversely, performance measurement makes input-output analysis
richer. The doctor not only knows how the parts of the body interact, but also how
healthy the patient is.
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